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GRIETA GILCHRIST*

Trout Unlimited
ABSTRACT
In April 2004, a Coloradoftderal district court ordered the U.S.
Forest Service to reconsider a 50-year easement that had been
granted to the Water Supply and Storage Company (WSSC).
This easement allowed the WSSC to store water on 390 acres of
federal land. The easement, however, had been granted without
the imposition of bypassflows. The Coloradofederal districtcourt
held that the Forest Service had authority to impose bypass flows
as a condition of a renewal of a special permit. The district court
reversed the easement granted to the WSSC. This articleexplores
the arguments and authorities that the district court relied on
when it held that the Forest Service had the authority to impose
bypass flows in the easement granted to the WSSC. This article
also presents counter-positions to the arguments relied on by the
ftderal district court.
INTRODUCTION
Most of the water in the arid western states originates in or flows
through federal lands.' Even though the water in the western states
originates mostly on the federal lands, it is state law that governs the
allocation of the water. The system of allocation in the western states is
the doctrine of prior appropriation. 2 Under state law, individuals have
property rights to the water that they divert and apply to a beneficial
use. 3 These individuals must often use federal land to transport their
water to the place of the beneficial use. The U.S. Forest Service typically
grants access to its land through a license or a special use permit. The
special use permits are often, by their terms, revocable and subject to the
conditions imposed by the Forest Service. 4 The state law governing water
allocation, the federal law governing the National Forests, and the
*

J.D., 2005, University of New Mexico School of Law.

1. "More than 60% percent of the average annual water in the 11 Western States is
from federal reservations." United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699 n.3 (1978).
2. The person who first physically diverts water from a stream and applies it to a
beneficial use in a non-wasteful manner is a prior appropriator. See, e.g., JOSEPH L. SAX ET
AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER REsouRcEs: CASES AND MATERIALS 98 (3d ed. 2000).

3. See generally id. at 111-15.
4. In Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, the District Court refers to the
special use permit as an easement; however, it is not a true easement because the parties
will have to renew the permit in 50 years. 320 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Colo. 2004).
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increasing demand for water have given rise to numerous conflicts, most
recently in Colorado.
Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, settlers of the western
5
states were encouraged to appropriate as much water as they could use.
Leaving water in the streams was considered waste of a valuable
resource. 6 The practice of appropriating all of the available water led to
completely drying up some rivers in the West.7 As attitudes have shifted
and society's values have changed, there has been a movement toward
environmental sustainability, such as protecting fish and wildlife
habitats and riparian areas, as well as protecting the aesthetic qualities of
the environment. 8 To support these objectives, however, it is necessary to
leave some water in the streams.
The Forest Service has long recognized these "new" objectives in
the federal lands.9 Because the water has been almost completely
appropriated by state users, there is essentially no water left for instream
flows to support these new objectives. Even if water existed that the
Forest Service could appropriate, the Forest Service would be the most
junior user and the last in a long line to receive water. Therefore, the
Forest Service began to look for other ways to obtain water for its needs.
In the 1970s, the Forest Service asserted that they had an implied water
right to maintain instream flows. 10 The state water right holders
challenged the assertion that the Forest Service had an implied water
right for instream flows for fish and wildlife purposes and the
controversy made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1978.
In United States v. New Mexico, the Supreme Court held that the
Forest Service did not have implied reserved water rights to maintain
"minimum instream flows for aesthetic, recreational, and fish-

5. See DANIEL M. GILLILAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION:
SEEKING A BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE 9-43 (1997).

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 43.
9. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 704 (1978) (The Forest Service
argued that it possessed an implied reserved water right to support fish and wildlife
habitat.).
10. The "implied-reservation-of-water" doctrine was first articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). When Congress withdrew
land from public domain, such as for Indian reservations or forest land, Congress did not
expressly reserve water for the federal reservations. When federal lands withdrawn from
public domain required water for the purposes for which they were created, their rights
often clashed with state water rights. The Supreme Court thus created the "impliedreservation-of-water" doctrine, which held that the federal government had impliedly
reserved water rights "to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation."
New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700 (citations omitted).
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preservation purposes."11 The Supreme Court held that the National
Forest system had two primary purposes: to furnish timber and to secure
favorable water flows.12 The Supreme Court characterized the instream
flows for aesthetic, recreational, and preservation purposes as
"secondary" and held that the secondary purposes conflicted with
Congress's intent that "the national forest system... [was] a means of
enhancing the quantity of water that would be available to the settlers of
the arid West." 13 The Supreme Court further reasoned that instream
flows "will frequently require a gallon-for-gallon reduction in the
amount of water available for water-needy state and private
appropriators." 14 Therefore, these secondary purposes conflicted with
the primary purpose of securing favorable water flows. The Court
directed the Forest Service to appropriate water that it required for the
secondary purposes under the applicable state law.' 5
The Court's directive was an empty one and the Forest Service's
water needs for the secondary purposes did not diminish. Therefore, the
Forest Service changed its focus in trying to obtain water for its
purposes. After the New Mexico case, the Forest Service asserted that it
had regulatory authority under the Federal Land Management and
Policy Act (FLPMA) to require instream flows when granting or
16
renewing permits for rights-of-way over federal lands.
FLPMA directs the Forest Service to "grant, issue, or
renew.. .rights-of-way over, upon, under or through" National Forest
lands. 17 These rights-of-way should include term conditions and terms
that will "minimize damage to scenic and esthetic values and fish and
wildlife habitat and otherwise protect the environment." 18 The Forest
Service asserted that FLPMA granted authority to require state water
right holders to leave water instream as a condition of the renewal of the
permits. Furthermore, the Forest Service claimed an inherent power as a
property owner to set conditions on the use of its land. Therefore, when
a state water right holder requested a new permit or, more likely,
renewed an existing permit to transport its water across federal lands,
the Forest Service began to impose the condition that the water right
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
2004).
17.
1105.
18.

New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 705.
Id. at 706.
Id. at 713.
Id. at 705.
Id.at 702.
See, e.g., Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Colo.
Title V of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (2000). See Trout Unlimited, 320 F. Supp. 2d at
43 U.S.C. § 1765(a).
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holders leave water in the stream or no permit would be granted. 19 Thus,
the Forest Service alleged that it was not claiming a water right but was
only exercising its regulatory and proprietary authority. 20 This argument
was disingenuous because the Forest Service was diminishing the state
water right holder's water and applying that water to the Forest Service's
purposes.
The Forest Service took this position in the lawsuit concerning
the renewal of a special use permit in a Colorado district court. The Trout
Unlimited case involved a permit renewal by the Water Supply and
Storage Company (WSSC). 21 The WSSC had first obtained a permit for
the use of the Forest Service land in 1973. The Forest Service issued a
series of short-term renewals. In 1981, the short-term permit was
extended until December 31, 1991. This permit was granted until July 31,
1994, to allow for the analysis of environmental impacts of the land use
authorization. It was this environmental analysis and the renewal of the
authorization that led to the Trout Unlimited litigation. The easement
granted to the WSSC did not contain an imposition of bypass flows,
despite the urging of the various governmental groups, as well as the
Plaintiff, Trout Unlimited. 22
In determining that the Forest Service had authority to impose
bypass flows as a condition of renewal of a permit,23 the district court
relied on the artificial distinction between state water rights and land use
rights. This artificial distinction between water and land rights allowed
the federal district to distinguish the Supreme Court's holding in United
States v. New Mexico from the facts presented in the Trout Unlimited
case. 24 The court in Trout Unlimited reasoned that the Forest Service's
power to prevent trespassing also gave the Forest Service power to
condition the use of its land. 25 The district court concluded that instream
flow conditions were a federal prerequisite to the use of its land, and it
did not matter that the federal prerequisite affected the water
appropriated under state law. 26
This artificial distinction between water rights and land use
rights allowed the Forest Service to obtain water from a prior
appropriator without having to defer to state law or the doctrine of prior
19. The Forest Service's arguments are discussed further in Trout Unlimited, 320 F.
Supp. 2d 1090.
20. Trout Unlimited, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1102-03.
21. Id. at 1095.
22. Id. at 1096-97.
23. Id. at 1106.
24. See id. at 1103.
25. Id. at 1105.
26. Id.
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appropriation and apply it to its own beneficial uses. 27 This artificial
distinction is problematic in many ways. First, this distinction ignores
the elements of acquiring a property right to water under prior
appropriation. Second, this artificial distinction ignores the fact that
under the doctrine of prior appropriation a state water right does include
a right to burden another's land. Therefore, under prior appropriation,
water rights and land use rights are irretrievably linked. Prior
appropriation and, indeed, the West itself, would not be what it is today
if water rights were separated from land use rights. Finally, when it is
clear that, under the law of prior appropriation water rights and land use
rights are not separate entities, the federal government may be estopped
from revoking access to the Forest Land.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE TROUT UNLIMITED LITIGATION
Trout Unlimited v. United States began when the Forest Service
issued a 50-year easement to the WSSC without imposing bypass flow
requirements. The Long Draw Dam, the subject of the Trout Unlimited
litigation, is a high mountain water storage facility located on La Poudre
Pass Creek. The La Poudre Pass watershed is located in the ArapahoRoosevelt National Forests, just west of Fort Collins, Colorado. The Long
Draw Dam was completed in 1929. The expansion of the dam almost 30
years later caused water to back up onto 390 acres and required the
WSSC to obtain authorization for the use of that land. WSSC stores water
in the reservoir and releases water for downstream municipal and
agricultural use.28
The permit was renewed several times from 1973 until 1980. In
1980, the Forest Service issued a new permit, which was amended in
1981 to extend the life of the permit until 1991.29 The 1981 amendment
specifically acknowledged that any future permits would be subject to
the conditions imposed by the Forest Service. When the permit was
subject to renewal in 1991, the Forest Service extended the life of the
existing permit until July 31, 1994, so that environmental impacts of the
30
land use could be analyzed.
During the time that the permit was extended, The Forest
Service warned the WSSC that the renewal of these land use
authorizations could include conditions that required minimum

27.

Id.

28.

Id. at 1095.

29.
30.

Id.
Id.
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amounts of water to be left in the stream.31 The owners of the water
facilities were alarmed at the possibility of the imposition of the bypass
flow conditions. They complained to Congress and argued that the
Forest Service did not have the authority to require instream flows as a
condition for the renewal of the permits. 32 These members of Congress
approached then-Secretary of Agriculture Edward Madigan. The
Secretary responded to these concerns, stating that "[n]ew bypass flow
requirements will not be imposed on existing water supply facilities." 33
In September 1993, the cities of Fort Collins and Greeley,
Colorado, and WSSC submitted a "Proposed Joint Operations for Mainstream Poudre River Flow Enhancement" (JOP). 34 The JOP provided for
additional flows for the Poudre River between December and March. 35
The WSSC proposed the JOP in anticipation of the renewal of the permit
in July 1994. This was a voluntary measure on the part of the WSSC and
the municipalities it served and, in turn, they requested that the Forest
Service not impose bypass flows. 36 In May 1994, the cities and the WSSC
offered the Forest Service a revised JOP. The cities and the WSSC
asserted that the revised JOP offered additional environmental benefits
37
in contrast to the original JOP.
The Forest Service had two alternatives in reissuing the permit to
WSSC. The Forest Service could either accept the JOP as a voluntary
mitigation method and issue the permit without the imposition of the
instream flow requirements, or it could issue the permit imposing the
condition of the instream flows. 38 Trout Unlimited, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, the National Park Service, and the
Forest Service itself recommended that the Forest Service adopt the
alternative that imposed bypass flows. 39 Ultimately, the Forest
Supervisor disregarded the comments urging the adoption of the
alternative imposing bypass flows and issued a Record of Decision
granting WSSC a land use authorization for the reservation with the JOP
as a voluntary mitigation measure. 40 The Forest Supervisor stated that he

31. Id.at 1096.
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting the "Madigan Policy").
34. Id. at 1096.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1097.
38. Id. at 1096.
39. Id. at 1097. The Forest Service's own assessment stated that "claims that the JOP
results in more aquatic habitat than the [imposition of a bypass flow] appear to be
unfounded from both a physical and biological perspective." Id. (internal edits omitted).
40. Id.
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reached his decision only after "considerable consultation, deliberation,
and reflection upon the proper balance of multiple uses of federal lands
and the appropriate environmental mitigation." The WSSC received the
renewed permit and Trout Unlimited filed suit against the United
41
States.
During the struggle between the WSSC and the Forest Service,
the public controversy over bypass flows continued. Hank Brown, a
Colorado Senator, proposed the "Brown Amendment" to the 1996 Farm
Bill. 42 This amendment, as originally proposed, would have amended
43
FLPMA to make bypass flow conditions in permit renewals unlawful.
However, a compromise was reached and the amendment imposed a 20month moratorium on the imposition of bypass flow requirements. 44 The
amendment also established a seven-member Water Rights Task Force to
study and make a report on national forest water issues.45 Trout
Unlimited stayed its litigation over the easement granted to WSSC until
the Task Force completed its recommendation. 46
The Task Force concluded that Congress did not have the
authority to require state water users to "relinquish a part of their
existing water supply or transfer their water rights to the United States
as a condition of the grant or renewal of federal permits." 47 This
conclusion did not resolve the dispute, however, because only four
members of the seven-member group joined in this conclusion. The other
three Task Force members disagreed with this conclusion, stating that
the Forest Service had regulatory authority under FLPMA to impose
bypass flow conditions as well as authority as a landowner to condition
the use of its land. 48 Because the Task Force opinion did not resolve the
dispute and Trout Unlimited disagreed with the majority's reasoning,
Trout Unlimited reinstituted the litigation in the Colorado federal district
court.

49

41. Id.
42. David M. Gillilan, Comment, Will There Be Water for the National Forests?, 69 U.
COLO. L. REv. 533,580 (1998).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 581 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-127 (Apr. 4, 1996), as amended Pub. L. No. 104-180
(Aug. 6,1996) (codified in relevant part at 16 U.S.C. § 526 note (Supp. 1997)).
45. Id.
46.

BENNETT RALEY ET AL., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS TASK FORCE pt. III

(1997), http://www.fs.fed.us/land/ (follow "Report of the Federal Water Rights Task
Force" hyperlink) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT) (discussing "The Colorado 'Bypass
Flow' Controversy").
47. Id. Executive Summary.
48. Id. pt. IX (presenting "Separate Views of Elizabeth Ann Rieke, David H. Getches,
and Richard Roos-Collins").
49. Id.
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II. THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT'S OPINION
After the Task Force issued its decision, Trout Unlimited sued
the Department of Agriculture (Defendants) over the Forest Service's
grant of the easement to WSSC. WSSC, Greeley, the Colorado State
Engineer, and the Colorado Conservation Board collectively (WSSC or
Intervenors) intervened as defendants. Trout Unlimited (Plaintiff)
alleged 13 claims against the Defendants. The district court dismissed
four of the 13 claims because Plaintiff had failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies.5 0 The district court denied eight of Plaintiff's
claims. 51 The district court, however, granted summary judgment in
favor of Plaintiff as to Plaintiff's first allegation, violation of FLPMA

section 505.52
In its claim under FLPMA, Trout Unlimited argued that the
Forest Service violated FLPMA when it granted the easement because
the easement did not contain conditions to "minimize damage.. .and
otherwise protect the environment." 53 The district court began its
opinion by noting that the standard of review required that
"[a]dministrative determinations may be set aside only for substantial
procedural or substantive reasons, and the court cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the agency."54
The WSSC intervened on Plaintiff's first claim, stating that the
"heart of this case" was whether Congress had authorized the Forest
Service to prevent non-federal parties from diverting water "in order to
make water available for downstream use by the Forest Service for fish
and wildlife habitat protection."5 5 The Intervenors argued that Congress
did not authorize the Forest Service to impose bypass flows "in order to
reallocate water from existing uses to unmet" Forest needs.56 This
authority would "contradict the repeated and explicit decisions by
Congress to defer to and respect state authority over water allocation
and use." 57 The Intervenors also asserted that the imposition of bypass
flows directly contradicted the "primary purpose" of the National Forest:
50. Plaintiff's alleged violations of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and
Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act (FRRRPA) (claims 2, 5, 9, and
13). Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1115 (D. Colo. 2004).
51. Plaintiff alleged other violations of NEPA (claims 3, 4, and 6) and FRRRPA (claims
7, 8, and 10) as well as violations of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and the Wilderness Act
(claims 11 and 12). Id. at 1097, 1098, 1115.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1106.
54. Id. at 1098-99.
55. Id. at 1102.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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to enhance the quantity of water available to nonfederal water users. The
Intervenors further alleged that the statutes that the Plaintiff and the
United States relied on to impose bypass flows did not grant that
authority, but, in fact, denied any authority of the federal government or
the Forest Service to interfere with nonfederal use of water. The
Intervenors concluded that imposition of bypass flows violated the
McCarren Amendment.5 Therefore, the Intervenors claimed that "the
failure of the Forest Service to impose conditions beyond its legal
authority cannot provide" a basis that the Forest Service violated the
law.
The Defendants countered these assertions by arguing that
"when the Forest Service requires bypass flows it is imposing a condition
59
on the use of federal land rather than asserting a water right."
Furthermore, Defendants pointed out that a Colorado water right does
not carry with it a right to use federal land.60 Defendants argued that the
Forest Service had "broad regulatory authority to impose conditions on
the use of its land even when those conditions affect private water
rights." 61 Defendants asserted that this authority came from the Organic
Act, FLPMA, and the agency's own proprietary capacity. Trout
Unlimited, agreeing with the Defendants' other arguments, further
asserted that the Forest Service has power to impose bypass flows under
62
their inherent power as a property owner.
The federal district court found that the Forest Service did have
authority to impose bypass flows and noted that,
on the rare occasions when bypass flows are required as a
condition to the use of federal lands, they neither reflect nor
establish a water right; rather, they merely address the
nature of the use to which a water right might be put once
the right is obtained from the State. 63
Because the Forest Service had authority to impose bypass flows as a
condition to the renewal of the permit for WSSC, the Forest Service's

58. Id. The McCarren Amendment was passed by Congress in 1952 and provided that
the federal government waive its sovereign immunity when a state government
adjudicates water rights. See, e.g., Nat'l Sci. & Tech. Ctr., BLM, Federal Reserved Water
Rights, http://www.blm.gov/nstc/WaterLaws/fedreservedwater.htm (last visited June 3,
2006).
59. Trout Unlimited, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1102.
60. Id.
61. Trout Unlimited, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1102.
62. Id. at 1103, 1106.
63. Id. at 1106.
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actions were arbitrary and capricious in issuing the permit without the
imposition of bypass flows. 64
In its opinion, the district court first addressed the Intervenors'
reliance on United States v. New Mexico. The district court drew a sharp
distinction between water rights and land use rights, stating that, while
the Court in New Mexico found that "Congress did not.. .intend to reserve
water rights for wildlife preservation purposes when it set aside lands
for national forests, United States v. New Mexico did not address the
power of the Forest Service to restrict the use of rights-of-way over
federal land for fish and wildlife purposes." According to the district
court, this case was not about water rights; thus, New Mexico did not
65
control.
After the district court determined that United States v. New
Mexico did not apply, it then relied on County of Okanogan v. National
Marine Fisheries Service, a Ninth Circuit case holding that the Forest
Service had authority to impose bypass flows. 66 The Ninth Circuit found
the Forest Service's authority to impose bypass flows from the statutes
governing the Forest Service, such as FLPMA, the Organic Act, the
National Forest Management Act (NFMA), and the Multiple Use
Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA).67 The district court adopted the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning, quoting the Okanogan court: "These statutes, in our
view, give the Forest Service authority to maintain certain levels of flow
in the rivers and streams within the boundaries of the.. .National Forest
to protect endangered fish species." 68
The court in Trout Unlimited also dismissed the Intervenors'
argument that the "savings clause" 69 was evidence that Congress did not
64. Id.
65. Id. at1103
66. County of Okanogan v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 347 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2003).
67. These statutes are only discussed as they are referenced in the cases that rely on
these statutes. For further reference on these statutes, please see the statutes themselves:
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000); Forest Service
Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2000); National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1600
(2000); Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2000).
68. Trout Unlimited, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1104 (quoting County of Okanogan, 347 F.3d at
1085).
69. The saving clause is found in 43 U.S.C. § 701. "Nothing in this Act.. shall be
construed as terminating any valid lease, permit,...right-of-way, or land use right or
authorization existing on the date of approval of this Act" (Oct. 1976). 42 U.S.C. § 1761 (a).
Nothing in this act shall be construed as limiting or restricting the power
and authority of the United States or 1) as affecting in any way any law
governing appropriation or use of, or federal right to, water on public
lands, 2) as expanding or diminishing Federal or State jurisdiction,
responsibility, interests or rights in water resources development or
control.
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intend to diminish any vested water rights guaranteed under state law.
The district court stated that the "rights-of-way were always, by their
written terms, revocable at the discretion of the federal government"
and, therefore, the case is "not a controversy over water rights, but over
rights-of-way through lands of the United States, which is a different
matter." 70
The district court then looked to City & County of Denver v.
Bergland,71 stating that "the Tenth Circuit has recognized that the Forest
Service's authority over its lands may be exercised to limit a water right
holder's use of water." 72 According to the district court, the Tenth Circuit
recognized that the right to appropriate water did not include a right to
use another's land and the Forest Service had a "duty to protect the
forests from injury and trespass, and the power to condition their use
and prohibit unauthorized uses." 73
The district court also found that Title V of FLPMA granted
authority to the Forest Service to "'grant, issue or renew rights-of-way
over, upon, under or through'... National Forest lands" and that each
right-of-way will "'minimize damage to scenic and esthetic values and
fish and wildlife habitat and otherwise protect the environment.'" 74
Therefore, the district court reasoned, the Forest Service is not asserting a
water right when imposing a bypass flow requirement, rather it is
placing conditions on the use of its land, as would any other property
owner. 75
Finally, the district court concluded its reasoning by relying on a
U.S. Supreme Court case that rejected the argument that the imposition
of bypass flows implicates or conflicts with state water rights. 76 PUD No.
1 v. Washington Department of Ecology involved a dispute over Clean
Water Act certification. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a water
right under state law "did not limit the scope of federal
regulation[s]... that may be imposed" on a water right holder. 77 The
minimum instream flows required under the Clean Water Act (CWA)
were federal prerequisites to the use of a water right obtained under
state law. The PUD No. 1 court, therefore, "recognized that the
43 U.S.C. § 1761 (g)(1), (2). Furthermore, "all actions by the Secretary concerned under this
Act shall be subject to valid existing rights." Id.
70. Trout Unlimited, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1104 (quoting Okanogan, 347 F.3d at 1086).
71. 695 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1982).
72. Trout Unlimited, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1104.
73. Id. at 1105 (quoting Bergland,695 F.2d at 476).
74. Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761(a), 1765(a)).
75. Id. at 1106.
76. PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
77. Trout Unlimited, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1105 (citing PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 720).
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regulatory action under federal law (minimum stream flow requirements) did not interfere with the state allocation because it neither
'reflected nor established' a water right." 78 Therefore, according to the
district court, the requirement of instream flows by the Forest Service
was a permissible federal prerequisite, similar to a federal prerequisite
required under the CWA. 79 According to the Trout Unlimited court, the
imposition of bypass flows by the Forest Service did not reflect or
8
establish a water right. 0
The district court, based upon the reasoning stated above, held
that the Forest Service had legal authority to impose bypass flow
conditions in a permit renewal. Once the district court found that the
Forest Service did, indeed, have the legal authority to impose bypass
flow conditions, the district court turned its attention to Plaintiff's actual
claim. 81 Plaintiff alleged that the United States, through the Forest
Service, had violated FLPMA when it issued a permit without the bypass
flow conditions. The district court agreed with Plaintiff, stating that
"requiring bypass flows was the environmentally preferred analysis." 82
Therefore, the district court determined that the Forest Service was
arbitrary and capricious when it issued the permit without the condition
of the bypass flow. 83 It reversed the easement granted to the WSSC and
remanded determination of the easement back to the Forest Service for
further consideration in accordance with its obligations under FLPMA. 84
III. ANALYSIS OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S REASONING
The Supreme Court's decision in New Mexico dealt a devastating
blow to the Forest Service's need for water for fish and wildlife
purposes.8 5 It is understandable and even desirable that there is water
available for those "secondary purposes." Furthermore, the need for
water for these secondary purposes has grown, rather than diminished.
However, by carefully analyzing the district court's reasoning and the
Forest Service's assertions, it is not clear or even particularly persuasive
that the Forest Service has regulatory or proprietary authority to
condition the use of their land by imposing minimum instream flows.
First, the claim that the Forest Service is not asserting a water right
78.

Id. (quoting PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 720-21).

79.

Id.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 1105-06.
Id. at 1106-10.
Id. at 1107.
Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1115.
See Introduction supra.
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ignores the elements of a property right under the doctrine of prior
appropriation. Second, the precedent that the district court relied on to
support the proposition that the Forest Service has this regulatory
authority to interfere with water rights because it is regulating its land is
questionable. The cases relied on by the Trout Unlimited court are
distinguished from Trout Unlimited on facts presented as well as a further
analysis of the federal statutes discussed within the precedent relied on
by the court in Trout Unlimited. Third, if the Forest Service has the same
rights as any other property owner to restrict access or condition the use
of their land, then the Forest Service must be governed by state property
law, such as prior appropriation, where water rights and land use rights
are intertwined. Furthermore, the Forest Service may be equitably
estopped from revoking access to its land because the state water right
holders reasonably expected continued access to the land and expended
substantial resources and labor on that expectation.
A. Doctrine of Prior Appropriation
To understand how the Trout Unlimited court creates an artificial
distinction between water use rights and land use rights, it is important
to understand the underlying principles of the doctrine of prior
appropriation. Under state law, water flowing naturally in a stream is
unowned and held by the state for acquisition by water users.8 6 The first
person who physically diverts the water from the natural stream and
applies it to a beneficial use in a non-wasteful manner acquires a
property right to that volume of water.87 Under the modern doctrine of
prior appropriation, a water right depends on the priority of the use, or
"first in time, first in right."88 However, a water right is not obtained just
by an individual being the first person to physically divert water. A
water right also depends on what the water is used for. It must be put to
beneficial use.8 9 Traditionally, water uses for domestic purposes, such as
mining, livestock grazing, and irrigation were considered beneficial.90
Water left in a stream was considered a waste of a valuable resource. 91
As society's values have shifted and environmental concerns have
become more prominent, the definition of beneficial uses has broadened.
Instream flows for "recreational purposes, including fishery or wildlife"
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 98.
Id.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 98.
Id.
Id.
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are now considered a beneficial use. 92 It is also important to remember
that, when water is diverted to be applied to a beneficial use, it must
usually be transported across another's land from the source to the
93
beneficial use.
According to the district court in Trout Unlimited, the imposition
of bypass flows as a condition to the use of National Forest land "does
not constitute the assertion of a water right." 94 Bypass flow condition is a
term that refers to a requirement that water, which would otherwise be
diverted in priority, is instead "bypassed" from the diversion and left in
the stream. 95 Water left in the stream reduces the amount of water that
an individual holds a right to and reduces the amount of water applied
to the beneficial use.96 When the Forest Service imposes a bypass flow
condition, the Forest Service prevents the state water right holder from
applying her water to her beneficial use. Furthermore, the Forest Service
is applying the water that it does not own to the Forest Service's
beneficial use, instream flows. Therefore, when the Forest Service
requires bypass flows, it is similar to a junior appropriator preventing
the senior appropriator from receiving her water and the junior
appropriator using the water that rightfully belongs to the senior
appropriator for the junior appropriator's use. "Regardless of whether
the Forest Service chooses to label its demand for water a 'water right,'
the purpose of a bypass flow requirement is to take water from the
owner of a water right so that it is available for use by the Forest Service
to attain National Forest purposes." 97
1. Precedent Relied on by the DistrictCourt
The district court concluded that the Forest Service had
regulatory authority to impose bypass flow conditions on state water
right holders who held permits to transport their water across National
Forest land. The district court reasoned that, when the Forest Service
imposes a bypass flow requirement, it is imposing a condition on the use
of federal land. 98 According to the court in Trout Unlimited, FLPMA and
other statutes governing the Forest Service mandate the imposition of the
92.

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-103(4) (West 2004).

93.
94.

See infra Part II.
Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1090,1105 (D. Colo. 2004).

95.

TASK FORCE REPORT, supranote 46.

96. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 715 (1978) ("A reservation of
additional water could mean a substantial loss in the amount of water available for
irrigation and domestic use, thereby defeating Congress' principle purpose of securing
favorable conditions of water flow.").
97.

TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 46.

98.

Trout Unlimited, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1106.
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bypass flow condition. The Ninth Circuit also reached this conclusion in
County of Okanogon v. NationalMarine FisheriesService.99
The court in Trout Unlimited relied heavily on the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning in County of Okanogan. The County of Okanogan litigation was
based on the same situation as the Trout Unlimited litigation. Irrigators,
who possessed Washington state water rights, used rights-of-way
located on National Forest land to deliver water to their property.
Renewable permits authorized these rights-of-way. 00 The Forest Service
placed instream flow conditions on these permits. The Forest Service
shut off the private ditches on the Forest Service in order to protect an
endangered salmon. The irrigators suffered severe property damage
when the water did not arrive. The water right holders brought suit over
the damage to their property.1° 1 The district court in County of Okanogan
held that the Forest Service had the authority to shut off the ditches to
prevent harm to the endangered species and the Ninth Circuit
102
affirmed.
In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit began with the proposition that
"[tihe permits themselves, from their inception, provided the government with unqualified discretion to restrict or terminate the rights-ofway." 10 3 Accordingly, this unqualified discretion allowed the Forest
Service to impose a condition that prevented the state water right
holders from receiving all of their water for three consecutive summer
months. 1°4 The Ninth Circuit found that the statutes governing the Forest
Service (FLPMA, the Organic Act, and MUSYA) granted it the authority
to impose bypass flows. 05 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit noted that the
Organic Act established National Forests "to improve and protect the
forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable
conditions of water flows." 106 The Ninth Circuit also noted that MUSYA
provided that "national forests are established and shall be administered
for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish

99. County of Okanogan v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 347 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2003)
(finding that the Endangered Species Act mandated instream flow condition).
100. Id. at 1092.
101. Id. at 1084.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1085.
104. James D. Bowen, The Collision of Land Use Water Law in the Methow River Valley, 38
GoNz. L. REv. 655,658 (2002).
105. County of Okanogan, 347 F.3d at 1085.
106. Id. (quoting the Organic Act of 1897, ch. 2, § 1, 30 Stat. 34, 35 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §
475 (2000)). The U.S. Supreme Court held in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 70708 & n.14 (1978), that the phrase "to improve and protect the forest" was not an
independent third purpose of the Organic Act.
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purposes." 10 7 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit noted that the "savings
clause" 10 8 of FLPMA did not protect the vested water rights of the
irrigators. 10 9 The Ninth Circuit stated that, while United States v. New
Mexico did address the Forest Service's water rights, it did not "address
the power of the Forest Service to restrict the use of the rights-of-way
over federal land." 10
The New Mexico court, like the Ninth Circuit in County of
Okanogan, discussed the Organic Act and MUSYA. An analysis of the
Supreme Court's discussion in New Mexico indicates that the Ninth
Circuit misinterpreted the statutes. First, the Supreme Court in New
Mexico concluded that "Congress intended national forests to be
reserved for two purposes -'to conserve the water flows, and to furnish
a continuous supply of timber for the people. '""' In New Mexico, the
federal government tried to argue that "improvement" and "protection"
formed a third purpose of the forest system. 112 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, stating that the improvement and protection of
the forests was for the two purposes of the forest system: securing
favorable water conditions and furnishing a continuous supply of
timber." 3 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in County of Okanogan relied on
the "improvement" and "protection" language in finding that the
Organic Act conferred authority on the Forest Service to impose bypass
flows. 114 This is the same language that the Supreme Court rejected as a
primary purpose for the National Forest system.115
The New Mexico court also discussed MUSYA. The Supreme
Court conceded that although MUSYA intended to broaden the purposes
"for which national forests had previously been administered," MUSYA
did not intend to reserve water rights for the federal forest system." 6
Congress included wildlife and fish purposes as well as recreation
purposes; however, as Congress itself warned, "the purposes.. .of this
title are declared to be supplemental to, but not in derogation of, the
purposes for which the national forests were established as set forth in

107. County of Okanogan, 347 F.3d at 1085 (quoting the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act
of 1960 § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).
108. See supra note 69 for text of the savings clause.
109. County of Okanogan, 347 F.3d at 1085.
110. Id. at 1086.
111. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 707 (internal edits omitted).
112. Id. at 707 n.14.
113. Id. (noting that the legislative history does not support a finding of a third and
separate purpose).
114. County of Okanogan, 347 F.3d at 1085.
115. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 707 n.14.
116. Id. at 713.
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the Organic Administration Act of 1897." n 7 Based upon this language,
the Supreme Court decided that Congress did not believe that the new
purposes enumerated in MUSYA were "so crucial as to require a
reservation of additional water."118
The Ninth Circuit in County of Okanogan conveniently ignored
the language stating that the purposes enumerated in MUSYA were to be
"supplemental to, but not in derogation of" the original purposes of the
forest system when it decided that the Forest Service had authority to
impose bypass flow conditions. This "supplemental to" language
included in MUYSA as well as the Supreme Court's discussion of
MUSYA cast doubt on the Ninth Circuit's reasoning that MUSYA grants
the Forest Service authority to impose bypass flows as a condition for
renewing a land use permit. The Okanogan court dismissed the Supreme
Court discussion on the two statutes, concluding that New Mexico did not
discuss the Forest Service authority over access to its land and the Forest
Service, by conditioning the use of its land, is not asserting a water
right." 9 As discussed above, this argument is disingenuous and ignores
the principles of prior appropriation. 120 It is clear that the New Mexico
case holds that the Forest Service did not have an implied reserved water
right for aesthetic, wildlife, and recreational purposes. The New Mexico
court was also quite clear that the Organic Act had two primary
purposes, which did not include the purpose to improve and protect the
national forests. It was also clear that the Supreme Court stated that
MUSYA was to broaden the National Forest system, but that MUSYA
was not to be in derogation of the Organic Act. 121 But the Ninth Circuit
dismissed all of these Supreme Court statements by creating a distinction
between land use and water rights. 122
The Ninth Circuit in County of Okanogan also reasoned that the
savings clause of FLPMA did not apply to the state water right holders'
vested water rights. The Ninth Circuit used two separate sections of the
savings clause to reason that the "vested rights" in the savings clause
was a vested right in land use or authorization. 123 The court in Okanogan
stated, "Under this savings clause, the government could not under
FLPMA divest a private party of an existing 'land use right' or other
'valid existing rights, but.. .the plaintiffs' rights-of-way were always, by
117. Id. (quoting Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1976 ed.)
(internal edits omitted).
118. Id. at 715.
119. County of Okanogan, 347 F.3d at 1086.
120. See supra Part II.A.
121. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 713.
122. See County of Okanogan, 347 F.3d at 1086.
123. Id. at 1085.
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their written terms, revocable at the discretion of the federal
government." 124 According to the Ninth Circuit, vested rights did not
include water rights under state property law. However, this statutory
construction of FLMPA ignores another part of the savings clause, that
"nothing in this Act shall be construed as...expanding or diminishing
Federal or State jurisdiction, responsibility, interests, or rights in water
resources development or control." 125 When the Ninth Circuit limited
"valid existing rights" to land use rights, it ignored the part of
the
savings clause that specifically deferred to water rights under state law.
When the section on affected rights is read in its entirety, the Ninth
Circuit's argument loses its persuasiveness and the district court's
reliance on the Ninth Circuit decision is misplaced. Based on this
misplaced reliance, the Trout Unlimited district court concluded that the
Forest Service had legal authority to impose bypass flows.
The Trout Unlimited court then turned to the Tenth Circuit for
authority for the proposition that "the Forest Service's authority over its
lands may be exercised to limit a water right holder's use of water." 126 In
City & County of Denver v. Bergland, Denver owned a right-of-way across
Forest land. Denver intended to use the right-of-way to transport water.
Denver began construction, but the Forest Service ordered Denver to
stop the construction. Denver was constructing the transportation
system parallel to their original alignment; however, the new transport
system was placed at a higher elevation. Denver argued that the Forest
Service was interfering with their water right as approved by Congress
in the Blue River Decree. 127 The Tenth Circuit, however, dismissed this
argument, stating that "the decree simply recognized Denver's right to
appropriate those waters." 128 The Tenth Circuit implicitly held that the
Blue River Decree did not discuss Denver's right-of-way. The court
concluded that the Forest Service had authority to stop the construction
because Denver was exceeding the scope of their grant and trespassing
on forest land. 129 The court reasoned that "[t]he right to appropriate the
waters of a stream does not carry with it a right to burden the lands of
another with a ditch" to transport water to its intended place of use.13°

124. Id.
125. Pub. L. No. 94-579 § 701(g)(2), 90 Stat. 2743, 2786 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1 701(g)(2)).
126. Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1104 (D. Colo. 2004)
(citing City & County of Denver v. Bergland, 695 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1982)).
127. Id. at 1105. The Blue River Decree was an adjudication of state water rights. See
Bergland, 695 F.2d 465.
128. Id. at 483.
129. Id. at 467-80.
130. Id. at 484.
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The district court in Trout Unlimited relied on the idea stated in
Bergland, namely that a water right does not carry with it a right to
burden another's land with a ditch.1 31 Bergland, however, merely stands
for the proposition that a water holder cannot trespass on Forest land to
transport its water. A state water right holder must either have
permission to transport water across the land or must pay just
compensation for the taking of the land. 132 Even though the Forest
Service objected to the trespass by Denver, the Bergland court did not
hold that the Forest Service could completely cut Denver off from their
water. The Bergland case, as utilized by the district court in Trout
Unlimited, does not support the proposition that the Forest Service can
limit a water holder's use of her water by limiting access to the land.
The district court then looked to Supreme Court precedent in
PUD NO. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology to find
that the Forest Service has authority to impose instream flows. The court
in Trout Unlimited stated, "The argument that imposition of bypass flows
implicates or conflicts with state water rights has been rejected by the
Supreme Court.... "133 Again, however, the precedent relied on by the
district court was substantially different than the facts of the Trout
Unlimited litigation. In PUD No. 1, the plaintiffs wanted to build a
hydroelectric generator1 34 The plaintiffs had to obtain various licenses in
order to complete the project, including one under state law that
required minimum instream flows. The state law was promulgated
135
pursuant to the Clean Water Act.
In PUD No. 1, the plaintiffs argued that instream flows violated
Congress's deference to state water allocation because the CWA states,
"the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within its
jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by
this chapter." 136 Justice O'Connor dismissed this argument and stated in
her opinion, "This language gives the States authority to allocate water
rights; we therefore find it peculiar that petitioners argue that [the CWA]
prevents the State from regulating stream flow." 137 However, the
Supreme Court recognized that "minimum stream flow requirements
131. This statement is not quite correct. Colorado case law actually holds that a water
right does not include in it a right to burden the land of another, unless there is consent or
just compensation for the taking of the land.
132. See, e.g., Part II.A.2.a.
133. Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1105 (D. Colo. 2004).
134. PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 703 (1994).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 720 (quoting the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) § 101,
33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000)).
137. Id.
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neither reflect nor establish proprietary rights to water," 138 and the
required certification determined the use a water right may be put to
139
under the CWA, "if and when it is obtained from the State."
The Supreme Court reinforced its holding with the legislative
history of the CWA. "The requirements [of the Act] may incidentally
affect individual water rights....It is not the purpose of this amendment
to prohibit those incidental effects.... [The] effects on individual rights, if
any, are prompted by legitimate and necessary water quality
considerations." 40 The Trout Unlimited district court similarly concluded,
based on the reasoning of the court in PUD No. 1, that bypass flow
conditions on special use permits were similar to permit requirements
under the CWA. The court in Trout Unlimited stated that bypass flow
conditions "merely address the nature of the use to which a water right
might be put once the right is obtained from the State." 141 However,
there are substantial differences between permits granted under the
CWA and permits granted by the Forest Service. The court in Trout
Unlimited misinterpreted the Supreme Court precedent in PUD No. 1.
First, it is unclear what the Supreme Court meant when they
stated that instream flows "neither reflect nor establish proprietary rights
to water." As discussed above, instream flows are considered a beneficial
use and water can be appropriated for this right. 142 The doctrine of prior
appropriation places the claimants to the shared resource in a legal
relationship with one another. Therefore, each water holder's rights
correlate with other appropriator's rights.143 When the Forest Service
demands instream flows for their "secondary" purposes, this instream
flow infringes on the correlative rights of the other appropriators. This
infringement on the other's rights is a measure of a water right and the
Service's disclaimer that they are not asserting a water right must fail. In
contrast, The Supreme Court defined and limited the definition of
proprietary rights to water under the Federal Power Act and then
extended this limited definition to the CWA in PUD No. 1. The U.S.
Supreme Court did not extend this definition of proprietary rights to the
Forest Service or to the statutes governing the Forest Service.144
138. Id. at 720-21 (quoting Cal. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 495 U.S. 490, 498
(1990)) (internal quotations omitted).
139. Id. at 721.
140. Id. (quoting 3 Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977, Ser. No. 95-14, at
532 (1978) (internal quotations omitted)).
141. Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1106 (D. Colo. 2004)
(quoting PUD No. 1,511 U.S. at 721).
142. See supra Part II.A.
143. SAX, supra note 2, at 98-100.
144. See generally PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. 700.
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Justice O'Connor relied on another Supreme Court case to
determine that, under the CWA, minimum instream flows did not reflect
or establish proprietary rights.145 In Californiav. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, California wanted to impose minimum instream
requirements on a river where a federally licensed hydroelectric project
was located. 146 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
argued that it had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the instream flows
from the hydroelectric project. California argued that the federal energy

statute reserved the right for states to "the control, appropriation, use,
or distribution of water used ...
for... other uses," and that other uses
included requiring instream flows to protect fish. 147 The Supreme Court
refused to disturb the finding of an earlier Supreme Court that
proprietary rights under the Federal Power Act (FPA) were limited to
municipal and irrigation uses. 148 It would seem that the Supreme Court
extended the definition of "proprietary rights" to the CWA in PUD No. 1.
At first glance, it would seem to make sense to apply this
definition of "proprietary rights," limited to municipal and irrigation
uses, to the Forest Service and its requirements for instream flows as a
condition on its use. But in fact, it would not make sense to extend the
Supreme Court's definition of "proprietary rights" to the Forest Service's
because the FPA and the CWA were not concerned with the allocation of
water among users. The CWA regulated the quality of water, 149 not the
allocation of water. The quality of water did affect the use of the water in
that case. Furthermore, Congress recognized that regulating the quality
of water would have incidental effects on the water allocation. 150 In
contrast, as discussed above, the main concern of the Forest Service is not
with the quality of water, but their demand for instream flows is a
demand for water for beneficial uses that compete with prior
appropriations for other beneficial uses. To state that bypass flow
requirements are a condition on the use of water is another disingenuous
argument as bypass flows affect the allocation of the water rather than
the quality of the water.
A careful analysis of the district court's opinion in Trout
Unlimited casts doubt on the Forest Service's assertion that it can impose

145. Id. at 720-21 (quoting Cal. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 495 U.S. 490, 498
(1990)).

146.

495 U.S. 490 (1990).

147. Id. at 497 (omissions in the original).
148. Id. (citing the Federal Power Act of 1935 § 27, 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1982)).
149. Low instream flows are considered pollution. PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 719.
150. Id. at 721 (quoting 3 Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977, ser. 95-14,
at 532 (1978)).
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bypass flows as a condition on the use of its land. This assertion relies on
the Forest Service's artificial distinction between land use and water
rights. This artificial distinction has no merit because when the Forest
Service demands that a state water user leave water in the natural
stream, it is reallocating water for its own beneficial use. Furthermore,
when the artificial distinction between land use rights and water use
rights is erased, it becomes harder to ignore the dictates of the Supreme
Court in New Mexico as to how the Forest Service is to manage its lands,
as well as the water that originates within those lands. The district court
mistakenly relies on case law discussing trespass to find that the Forest
Service has authority to require bypass flows. Finally, the district court's
reasoning to reach its ultimate holding that the Forest Service has legal
authority to impose bypass flows is unpersuasive when it relies on a
limited definition of "proprietary rights," as defined by the Supreme
Court, and reasoning that the Forest Service is not asserting a proprietary
right to the water it is demanding remain in the stream.
2. The Forest Service as a PropertyOwner
In Trout Unlimited, the district court did not separately address
the federal government's argument that it has inherent powers as a
property owner that allow the Forest Service to impose bypass flows as a
condition of the use of its land. This discussion was embedded in the
district court's analysis of the Forest Service's regulatory power. To
thoroughly understand the United States' argument and the district
court's reasoning, it is necessary to address this property argument. The
Task Force minority summarized this argument, stating, "Like any other
property owner, the United States should be expected to allow uses of
and access to its lands only on conditions that are consistent with its land
management objectives." 151 Following this thought to its logical
conclusion, permit holders who use federal lands must comply with
52
conditions or they will lose their permit to use the federal land.
Proponents of this argument always begin the argument with "Congress
[has] the power to control [the] occupancy and use [in federal lands], to
protect them from trespass and injury, and to prescribe the conditions
upon which others may obtain rights in them...."153 However, this
argument distracts from the issue of whether the Forest Service has legal
authority to take water that has already been appropriated by another
151. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 46, pt. IX (presenting "Separate Views of Elizabeth
Ann Rieke, David H. Getches, and Richard Roos-Collins").
152. See County of Okanogan v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 347 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th
Cir. 2003).
153. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1917).
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and apply that water to instream uses. The argument that the United
States has inherent powers as a property owner to protect its land creates
the artificial distinction, once again, between water rights and land use
rights.
In Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, the Forest Service sued
to enjoin the defendants from using National Forest land.5 4 The
defendants did not have a grant or a license from either the Department
of the Interior or the Department of Agriculture to use federal land. 155
The power company built powerhouses, transmission lines, pipelines,
and diversion dams on National Forest land.'5 The Power Company
then used water it acquired under state law to generate electricity. 5 7 The
Forest Service wanted the defendants off of the land and the Supreme
Court agreed with the Forest Service. 15 Utah Power & Light Co. stands,
then, for the unremarkable proposition that one person is not allowed to
go onto another's land, without their permission, and build on it.159
At the end of the opinion, almost as an afterthought, the
Supreme Court in Utah Power & Light Co. addressed the defendants'
argument that the Forest Service was interfering with their water rights
granted under state law. This argument was quickly dismissed with the
statement, "this is not a controversy over water rights, but over rights of
way through lands of the United States, which is a different matter.... "160
This quote has been used again and again to support the distinction
between land use regulation and water rights.161 Therefore, the reasoning
goes, because bypass flows are a condition on land use, they are not
interfering with state water rights.
When determining that the Utah Power & Light Co. controversy
was not a dispute over water rights, the court relied on the premise that
"the right to appropriate the waters of a stream does not carry with it the
right to burden the lands of another with a ditch for the purpose of
diverting the waters and carrying them to the place of intended use, for
that cannot be done without a grant from the landowner...." 162 Of

154. See id.
155. Id. at 403.
156. Id. at 402.
157. Id. at 411.
158. Id.
159. 243 U.S. 389.
160. Id. at 411.
161. See, e.g., County of Okanogan v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 347 F.3d 1081, 1086
(9th Cir. 2003); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 46, pt. IX (presenting "Separate Views of
Elizabeth Ann Rieke, David H. Getches, and Richard Roos-Collins").
162. City & County of Denver v. Bergland, 695 F.2d 465, 483-84 (10th Cir. 1982)
(quoting Snyder v. Colo. Gold Dredging Co., 181 F. 62, 69 (8th Cir. 1910)).
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course, the Supreme Court was correct in stating that Utah Power & Light
Co. was not a dispute about water rights; it was a dispute about
trespassing on federal lands. The power company did not have
permission, in the form of an easement, grant, or license, to enter the
National Forest. The case might have been about water rights if the
power company had permission to enter the federal lands and then the
Forest Service took some of the power company's water for National
Forest purposes.
The court in Utah Power & Light Co. relied on a 1910 Eighth
Circuit opinion for the proposition that a water right does not carry with
it a right to burden another's land. In Snyder v. Colorado Gold Dredging
Co., the plaintiff had an easement to transport water across the
defendant's land. 163 The plaintiff entered the defendant's land, without
his permission, and enlarged the ditch. This enlarged ditch increased the
plaintiff's water supply beyond what he had appropriated under state
law. The defendant, in the meantime, built his own ditch parallel to the
plaintiff's ditch and this parallel ditch caused some of the water to seep
from the plaintiff's ditch. The plaintiff argued that the defendant
interfered with his increased water right.1M The Snyder court held that
the plaintiff did not have a right to the excess water appropriated and
the easement granted to the plaintiff
extended only to the maintenance and use of the ditch,
substantially as then constructed, for the purpose of
diverting and carrying the volume of water theretofore
appropriated, and did not give any right to enlarge the
ditch, or to change its location, or to use it in diverting and
165
carrying a largely increased volume of water.
The court continued by stating that the enlargement of the original ditch
required either consent from the defendant or "appropriate condemnation proceedings." 166 Because there were neither, the appropriation
was initiated by the means of trespass and the maintenance and
167
enjoyment of the appropriation depended on the continued trespass.
Therefore, when the court in Snyder held that a water right did
not carry with it a right to burden another's land, the court was clearly
concerned with trespass. The court was careful to draw a distinction
between trespass on the burdened land and either consent by the
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

181 F. 62 (8th Cir. 1910).
Id. at 66.
Id. at 70.
Id.
Id.
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burdened property owner or appropriate condemnation proceedings
against the burdened property owner. 68 Furthermore, implicit in the
court's holding is the rule that a water right in the Colorado does allow
one to burden another's land in the form of a ditch to transport water as
long as there is consent or just payment for the taking of the land. 169 The
Snyder court did not hold that, once consent is granted by the burdened
property owner, the property owner could then revoke all access to his
land.
Because of the language that a water right does not carry with it
a right to burden another's land, Snyder has been relied on to support the
Forest Service's position that it can condition the use of its land, even
when requiring bypass flows. 70 It is true that the Forest Service is
allowed to determine how and when another can burden its land.
However, in the Trout Unlimited case, the Forest Service granted
permission to the state water right holders to do so. In the Snyder and
Utah cases, the facts presented involved the party trespassing onto
another's land to transport their water.
If the United States has inherent power as a property owner to
condition the use of its land, it follows then that state law should govern
the United States as a property owner as state law governs all other
property owners. While "public land law makes it clear that.. .federal
authority over government-owned lands is even greater than that of a
private proprietor," i7' it would seem that state property law would still
govern the federal government. Two ideas flow from this. First,
Colorado law does grant a right to use another's land in order to
appropriate water. Second, even though these permits are revocable
licenses, the federal government may be estopped from revoking those
licenses if the licensee does not comply with newly imposed conditions,
such as bypass flow conditions.172

168. Id.
169. See id.
170. See, e.g., Thomas K. Snodgrass, Comment, Bypass Flow Requirements and the Question
of Forest Service Authority, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 641, 669 (1999).
171. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 46, pt. IX (presenting "Separate Views of Elizabeth
Ann Rieke, David H. Getches, and Richard Roos-Collins").
172. Another argument against the power of the Forest Service preventing state water
right holders from accessing their water is put forth in Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570
(2001). In Hage, the Federal Claims Court ruled that state water rights were a property right
that required just compensation when the government took the water. Specifically, the
court held that "the government cannot cancel a grazing permit and then prohibit the
plaintiffs from accessing the water to redirect to another place of valid beneficial use. The
plaintiffs have a right to go onto the land and divert the water." Id. at 584.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

a. Private Condemnation
In the eastern United States, where water is plentiful, water
rights were assigned on the "basis of ownership of tracts of land that are
contiguous to the water" and were limited to the "boundaries of such
tracts." 173 This type of water allocation, or riparianism, worked well in
humid climates, where there was sufficient rainfall to grow crops and the
plentiful water supplies minimized conflicts between water users. It does
not work well for arid western states, however. 7 4 Granting property
rights in water to those whose land was contiguous with the river did
not make sense in the arid west because it was not practical. The early
settlers, who had to settle away from the rivers, still realized that if water
could be diverted from the natural watercourses, the land could be
cultivated and productive. Diverting this water away from the natural
stream, however, meant that the water right holder had to cross
another's land, usually in the form of a ditch. 175 Therefore, western
legislators passed statutes that directed that any person who owned a
water right "shall be entitled to a right-of-way through the lands which
lie between the point of diversion and point of use.... "176 Clearly then,
the doctrine of prior appropriation does include the right to cross
another's land, as long as there is either consent or just compensation for
the taking of the land. According to the Colorado Supreme Court,
"Lands situated at a distance from a stream cannot be irrigated without
passing over the intermediate lands, and thus all tilled lands are subject
to the same necessity .... [W]here the rain falls upon the just and the
177
unjust, this necessity is unknown, and is not recognized by law."
As early as 1872, the Supreme Court of the Colorado Territory
had an opportunity to analyze whether a water right carried with it the
right to cross another's land.178 In Yunker v. Nichols, the plaintiff, together
with the defendant, constructed a ditch across the defendant's land. The
agreement was that all parties would share in the water supply. After the
construction of the ditch, the defendant diverted all of the water and
none reached the plaintiff. The parties did not have a written agreement
173. SAX, supra note 2, at 21.
174. Gillian, supra note 5, at 10-21.
175. Id.
176. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-86-102 (West 2004). See also Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361
(1905) (holding that a similar statute in Utah was constitutionally valid for the legislature to
delegate its eminent domain powers to private individuals to condemn another's property
for the public use of water where it was a necessity to make use of land.) The ruling
distinguished between the rights of a riparian owner in the arid west and those in the east.
Id.
177. Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 553 (1872).
178. Id. at 552-56.
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detailing the arrangement between the defendant and the plaintiff. The
jury found for the defendant that he could divert all the water from the
ditch on his land. 179
The court in Yunker reversed the jury verdict. Each of the justices
concurred that the judgment below should be reversed, but they based
their decisions on different reasons. The Chief Justice reasoned that the
Colorado Territory was a "a dry and thirsty land" and that the "value
and usefulness of the land depends on the supply of water for
irrigation... [that] can only be obtained by constructing artificial channels
through which [the water] may flow over adjacent lands." 18° Therefore,
the Chief Justice concluded that servitude on the land arose, not by a
grant, but by "the operation of law," and that it was not necessary for
defendant to convey to the plaintiff a right of way for the ditch. 181 The
second justice relied on the statute passed by the legislature to find that
the plaintiff should prevail. Because agriculture is so essential to the
"well-being of [Colorado] and can only be developed by a system of
irrigation, it seems to me a matter of absolute necessity, that the
legislature should have the power to pass needful laws" to facilitate the
agriculture interests. 182 The third justice relied on the necessity of the
right and, even though the statute granted the right, it was the necessity
of the climate that gave a right to "every proprietor to have a way over
the lands intervening between his possessions and the neighboring
stream for the passage of water for irrigation .... 183
Although the justices disagreed on the reasons, they all agreed
that the right to appropriate water included a right to convey that water
over another's land. Yunker is still good law in Colorado. A recent
Colorado Supreme Court ruling relied on Yunker when it reasoned,
Colorado is not a riparian state in which only those lands
adjacent to the streams and rivers have rights to waters.
Rather, as early as the tenure of the territorial legislature,
our lawmakers recognized that our arid climate required
the creation of a right to appropriate and convey water
across the land of another so that lands not immediately
proximate to water could be used and developed.'8 4
179. Id. at 555.
180. Id. at 553 (Hallett, C.J., concurring).
181. Id. at 555.
182. Id. at 567 (Belford, J., concurring) (Justice Belford also discussed that estoppel
should apply even though the lack of writing violated the statute of frauds.).
183. Id. at 569-70 (Wells, J., concurring in part) (Justice Wells did not agree with the
ruling as based upon Belford's theory of estoppel nor on the statute of irrigated lands.).
184. Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude's Co., 36 P.3d 1229,1231-32 (Colo. 2001).
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When an individual appropriated water from the stream to land
that was not contiguous to the stream, the individual usually received
consent from the owner of the land that the water crossed. 85 This
consent was either given in exchange for consideration paid or consent
was implied when the parties did not object to the construction and use
of the ditch.186 The Yunker case and subsequent Colorado cases illustrate
that the doctrine of prior appropriation does include a right to burden
another's land. 8 7 However, the Forest Service and other proponents of
the argument that the Forest Service is just protecting its land as any
other property owner would conveniently ignore that the right to burden
another's land is included in the right to appropriate water.
The courts that have addressed the issue of bypass flow
requirements relied on Utah Power & Light Co. and implicitly Snyder to
argue that a water right does not carry with it a right to burden another's
land.18 8 As seen from Colorado law, this argument fails. Prior
appropriation does carry with it a right to use another's land, once
consent is either obtained or implied or when the parties initiate private
condemnation actions. 189 The cases do not discuss, nor implicitly hold,
that, once consent has been granted, the burdened property owner could
then revoke all access to his property. As the discussion above on the
Colorado case law clearly shows, the Trout Unlimited court relied on an
artificial distinction between water rights and land use rights and this
artificial distinction does not make sense under the prior appropriation
doctrine. It is necessary to use another's land to transport water and once
the burdened property owner has granted consent, he may not revoke all
access to the water or to the land. 190 Therefore, the Forest Service's
argument must fail.

185. Id.
186. See Leonard v. Buerger, 276 P.2d 986, 989 (Colo. 1954) ("IWhen ditch is used
without objection.. consent is presumed.").
187. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, LLP, 45 P.3d
693, 706 (Colo. 2002); Roaring Fork Club, 36 P.3d 1229; Leonard, 276 P.2d at 989.
188. See, e.g., County of Okanogan v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 347 F.3d 1081 (9th
Cir. 2003).
189. See also Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 467 P.2d 986, 991 (N.M. 1970) (holding
that a corporation had the right to condemn a right-of-way over adjacent private property
for the purpose of laying pipeline to transport water from the river that the corporation had
water rights to for their coal mining operation). The court stated that "beneficial uses
would be impossible to accomplish without the means to transport or convey the water
from its source to the place of utilization." Id.
190. See cases cited supranote 187.
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b. Equitable Estoppel
The Forest Service, as well as the Trout Unlimited plaintiffs, took
the position that they had inherent authority as a property owner to
condition the use of its land. This authority allowed the Forest Service to
either exclude individuals from its land or grant individuals access to its
land. 191 It then follows that the access can be limited and revoked at any
time. 192 As the Ninth Circuit stated in County of Okanogan, the consent
granted by the Forest Service was "always, by their written terms,
revocable at the discretion of the federal government." 193 However,
another way to view these revocable permits issued by the Forest Service
is to compare these permits to licenses granted under state property law.
Licenses grant the non-property owner permission to enter the
property owner's land for temporary, specific purposes and they are
revocable at the will of the grantor. 194 In the present case, the WSSC's
special use permits automatically expired after a certain length of time
and the Forest Service had an option not to renew. 195 An obvious parallel
can be drawn between WSSC's special use permit and a license granted
under state law. Under state property law, a license can sometimes ripen
into an irrevocable easement. 196 An owner who opens his property to
another, even temporarily, may create a reasonable expectation of
continued access to the property. 197 The courts may find a reasonable
expectation on the part of the non-owner when the non-owner expends
resources and labor on reliance of the continued permitted access.1 98
Courts in states that follow the doctrine of prior appropriation
have found licenses that granted a right to transport water across
another's land ripened into an irrevocable easement. For example, a
Colorado court, in De Graffenried v. Savage, held that even though initially
the right to enter the land to construct a ditch may have been a license

191. See, e.g., County of Okanogon, 347 F.3d 1081; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 46, pt.
LX (presenting "Separate Views of Elizabeth Ann Rieke, David H. Getches, and Richard
Roos-Collins").
192. See, e.g., County of Okanogon, 347 F.3d 1081; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 46, pt.
IX (presenting "Separate Views of Elizabeth Ann Rieke, David H. Getches, and Richard
Roos-Collins").
193. County of Okanogan, 347 F.3d at 1085.
194.

JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES § 5.2 (3d

ed. 2002).
195. Trout Unlimited v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 2d. 1090,1095 (Colo. D.C. 2004).
196. SINGER, supra note 194, § 5.3.1.1 ("Easements by Estoppel").
197. Id.
198. Id.
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and therefore revocable, "after entry and construction of the ditch, [the
license] operates as a grant, and such grant is presumed and implied." 199
The Colorado Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in
Leonard v. Buerger.200 When a "ditch actually is excavated and put into
use without objection, or by approval, the owner of land traversed
thereby may not thereafter withdraw his consent, deny the right of
maintenance or destroy the ditch." 201 Both of these Colorado cases
involved disputes over ditches that were used to transport water to land
where it was then used to irrigate and cultivate the land. Both Colorado
courts found that when an owner consented to allow another to build a
ditch to transport water that the consent became a grant once the ditch
was actually constructed. Neither Colorado case discussed the reasoning
behind finding each license irrevocable; however, it is most analogous to
an easement by estoppel. 2 2 The doctrine of easement by estoppel derives
203
from the principles of equitable estoppel.
In order to successfully assert estoppel, a party must show that
(1) the government had knowledge of the facts, (2) the government
intended its actions to be relied on, (3) the party asserting the defense
was ignorant of the true facts, and (4) the party relied on the
government's conduct to his detriment.2°4 However, it is well settled that
"equitable estoppel will not lie against the Government as it lies against
private litigants." 20 5 Thus, while the Supreme Court has made it difficult
to successfully argue equitable estoppel against the federal government,
it has not completely foreclosed the use of equitable estoppel against the
government.
The lower federal courts have, in some instances, applied
equitable estoppel against the federal government. 206 The courts have
199. De Graffenried v. Savage 47 P. 902, 903 (Colo. Ct. App. 1897).
200. 276 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1954).
201. Id. at 989. See also Stoner v. Zucker, 83 P. 808, 809-10, 820 (Cal. 1906) (Once a
licensee has spent money or labor in execution of a license, it becomes irrevocable and the
license will continue as long as a need exists for it; license for "irrigating ditches.. .becomes,
in all essentials, an easement, continuing for such length of time.. .as the use itself may
continue."); Shepard v. Purvine, 248 P.2d 352 (Or. 1952) (An oral license promptly acted
upon in the manner the plaintiffs acted is just as valid, binding, and irrevocable as a
deeded right of way.).
202. See cases cited supra note 201.
203. See SINGER, supra note 194, § 5.3.1.1.
204. United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92, 96 (9th Cir. 1970).
205. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 419 (1990); Heckler v. Cmty.
Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984).
206. See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific,421 F.2d 92 (holding that government was not entitled to
immunity from government estoppel); United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985 (9th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Fox Lake
State Bank, 366 F.2d 962 (1966).

Winter 20061

TROUT UNLIMITED

used various tools to determine whether estoppel should lie against the
government, such as public policies, strict analysis of the elements of
estoppel, affirmative misconduct of the government official, and
determining whether the government was acting in its sovereign or
20 7
proprietary capacity.
When analyzing public policy issues, the courts sometimes
engage in balancing the private individual's interest against the public's
interest. Estoppel will be applied if there is a "serious injustice
outweighing the damage to the public interest of estopping the
government."2 °8 In Union Oil Co. of Californiav. Morton, the Ninth Circuit
refused to apply equitable estoppel because "the costs to the public could
be enormous if the government were estopped from maintaining
vigorous regulation of the oil companies' drilling...." 20 9 In general, the
courts have found that the potential harm to the public outweighs the
injustice to the individual if equitable estoppel is applied.210
In the present case, the controversy between WSSC and the
Forest Service is a controversy between two important public interests.
The WSSC had a primary interest in maintaining its water rights, while
the Forest Service was concerned with the bigger picture of
environmental sustainability. However, the WSSC provided and
continues to provide an important function in which the public is
interested. The WSSC provides water for domestic and municipal use. If
the government was not estopped to revoke access to its lands, there
would be substantial damage to the public interest in its access to water
for domestic and municipal uses. A court, in deciding whether to apply
equitable estoppel, would have to balance these two important public
interests.
Even if a court declined to find for a water right holder based on
public policy grounds, a strict analysis of the elements of estoppel still
favors applying estoppel against the Forest Service. The courts tend to
207. For a more thorough analysis of these tools, see Mary V. Laitos et al., Equitable
Defenses Against the Government in the Natural Resources and Environmental Law Context, 17
PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 273, 275-96 (2000).
208. Bolt v. United States, 944 F.2d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
209. Laitos et al., supra note 207, at 281 (quoting Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 512
F.2d 743, 749, n.2 (9th Cir. 1975)). The Union Oil dispute involved four companies that
purchased gas and oil rights in the Santa Barbara channel. The Secretary of the Interior
granted permission to construct four floating drilling platforms. Two were constructed, but
before the third was constructed there was a blowout on the first platform that led to a
huge oil spill with disastrous consequences. The Secretary of the Interior refused to let the
platforms be finished or drilling begin. The plaintiff's tried to argue equitable estoppel, but
the court, in balancing the private interest with the public interest, refused to apply
equitable estoppel. Union Oil, 512 F.2d 743.
210. See Laitos et al., supra note 207, at 280-81.
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focus on whether the party asserting the defense has reasonably relied
on the government to his detriment. 211 For example, detrimental reliance
may exist when the party is claiming that he is deprived of something
that is his by right.212 It is, however, not reasonable to rely on oral
representations by governmental officials. 213 In the instance of the Trout
Unlimited case, it could be argued that the state water right holders
reasonably relied on the Forest Service as well as the federal government
that the individuals could use the forest land to transport their water to
its intended beneficial use.
The federal government encouraged the growth of the sparsely
populated West by providing water to family farms. 214 The federal
government subsidized dams in order to provide "wide margins of
safety for recurring periods of drought and highly variable rainfall
patterns... "215 These dams collected the water on federal land and state
water right holders constructed ditches to transport the water through
federal land to the state water right holders' land, where the water was
used to cultivate the land.216 The West grew from a sparsely populated
217
agricultural region to a "highly urbanized region of the country."
The federal government promised the new settlers in the West
access to the federal land to obtain water and to ultimately encourage
growth in the West. 218 The West is still steadily growing and this growth
is based on the underlying promise the federal government made to the
early settlers. Individuals may not be aware of how the West grew and
may not consider this implicit, underlying promise that the federal
government made to the early Western settlers. However, if suddenly
the federal government could revoke the access to their land, life in the
West would undergo a fundamental change. In this instance, Congress
made a representation to the settlers of the West, the settlers believed
and relied on that representation and if the government were to revoke
the representation, the injury to the western states would be grave and
possibly outweigh the harm to the forest lands.
Furthermore, there is a strong argument to apply equitable
estoppel against the federal government when the federal government is
acting in its proprietary capacity. It is important to note tihat courts seem
211. Id. at 285.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 286.
214. A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT.
RESoURcEs J. 769, 770-73 (2001).
215. Id. at 771.
216. See id.
217. Id. at 772-73.
218. See id. at 770-71.
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to be more willing to apply equitable estoppel against the government
when it is acting in a proprietary capacity as opposed to its sovereign
capacity. 219 The courts do not appear to agree when the government is
acting in a proprietary capacity rather than its sovereign capacity. The
general rule is that the government will not be estopped when acting in
its sovereign capacity and acting for the good of the public. 220 On the
other hand, the government is acting in its proprietary capacity when
involved in commercial or contract transactions. 221
In determining whether to apply equitable estoppel against the
federal government, the court would need to decide in what capacity the
Forest Service is acting. On one hand, it is acting as a sovereign because
it wants instream flows for the benefit of the public. However, the Forest
Service is asserting that it is like any other property owner and from this
assertion alone-as well as viewing each agreement with each state
water right holder-the government could be said to be acting in a
proprietary capacity. The lynchpin of the Forest Service's assertion that it
can impose bypass flows is that it has inherent power as a property
owner to exclude others from its land. As the Supreme Court stated,
Congress and its agents have the "power to control.. .occupancy and use
of [federal lands], to protect them from trespass and injury, and to
prescribe the conditions upon which others may obtain rights in
them... "222
There can be little doubt that asserting an equitable estoppel
claim against the federal government is difficult and it is unusual for the
government to lose on such a claim. However, it is equally clear that this
is a different set of circumstances than is found in most equitable
estoppel cases against the government. If the government were allowed
to revoke every state water right holder's access to the federal land, the
repercussions of this would be felt further than just the parties involved
with the property transaction. It is worth arguing for.
CONCLUSION
There is little disagreement that water in the stream is desirable
to support fish and wildlife habitat as well as outdoor recreation. There
is, unfortunately, little agreement about how the Forest Service will or
should be permitted to obtain the water for these purposes. The
foregoing discussion highlights the difficulties of the Forest Service's
219.
220.
221.
222.

See Laitos et al., supra note 207, at 293.
Id. at 293-94.
Id.
Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389,405 (1917).
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assertion that it is not claiming a water right. The artificial distinction
between land use rights and water rights ignores the fact that, when the
Forest Service demands instream flows, it is preventing a senior user
from obtaining her water while at the same time the Forest Service is
applying that water to its own beneficial use. Likewise, the artificial
distinction between land use rights and water rights does not exist in
states, such as Colorado, that recognize the doctrine of prior
appropriation. Finally, the states and its individual water users may be
able to argue equitable estoppel against the federal government because
the states and the individual water users have become substantially
invested by relying on the federal government's assurances as to
continued access across its land to transport their water.

